PB November 2013 Svarajya Siddhih: Attaining Self-dominion Gangadharendra Saraswati Translated from Sanskrit and annotated by Swami Narasimhananda (Continued from the previous issue ) e now look at Udayanacharya's stand regarding Ishvara being the cause of the universe, as shown in his Nyaya treatise Nyayakusumanjali. The objec- tion against this stand of the Nyaya philosophy is that if Ishvara were to be held as the creator of the universe, then Ishvara becomes corporeal. Also, since Ishvara lacks physical instruments like the body, it cannot create the universe. Udayanacharya refutes both these arguments on the basis of the fallacy of the non-existence of the subject. Since the opponent of the Nyaya school does not believe in Ishvara, it cannot be presented as the subject in both the arguments. Udayana also posits the fallacy of contradiction. The school opposing the Nyaya thought does not hold that Ishvara is corporeal. However, if Ishvara is made the subject of the Nyaya oppon- ents' arguments, they cannot hold that there is no agency in Ishvara because that would mean a self-contradiction. This view is further ex- plained by a philosopher: When the theist seeks to prove the existence of God, he does so with the aim in view that God is the creator. So in any attempt to prove the non-existence of God with the help of any in- ference where God is posited as the subject, the opponent will commit the fallacy of devi ation from accepted tenet (siddhānta-vyāghāta). In order to obviate the discrepancy set forth above, the opponent may aver that God is not the subject of the inference. It is the earth, the sprout, etc. that stand as the subject. Then the process of reasoning stands as follows: The earth, the sprout and the like are produced by some corporeal author, since they are effects. In this counter-argument the opponent draws a universal concomitance between effect- as- such (kāryatva) and precedence of corporeal authorship. But Udayana here points out that if any such universal relation could be established, there would have been no bar to the acceptance of the cogency of the opponent's argument. But the fact is that these two are in no way related through concomitance in presence and absence. The earth would here serve as the contrary in- stance (vipakṣa), which is after all, a product, as the opponent also admits, but it is not preceded by some corporeal author. Hence, the inference involves discrepancy (vyabhicāra). The opponent may, however, endeavour to prove that the earth and other grand phenom- ena of nature are not products at all, for the simple reason that they do not stand in need of any corporeal agent. But such a position would stand contradicted by perceptual knowledge. It may be further contended that the earth, the sprout, etc. are not produced by any agent since they are not produced by a body. But Udayana retorts that the reason here employed suffers from the defect of superficial attribu- tion. 'Not being produced' would be sufficient to prove that the earth and the like are not pro- duced by any agent. Thus, the adjunct in the reason is superfluous, involving the fallacy of W PB November 2013646 Prabuddha Bharata52 futile adjunct (vyāpyatvāsiddhi). If, however, the opponent agrees to do away with the ad- junct in the reason, then also there is no escape from the fallacy of svarūpāsiddhi, as the reason of the inference would then stand as 'not being produced' (ajanyatva), which does not neces- sarily subsist in the subject. None is prepared to admit that the earth, the sprout, etc. are not produced at all. It is worthy of notice that Udayana, after weighing the counter-inferences advanced by the opponent, proceeds to enquire about the pur- pose in view with which the opponent employs these counter-inferences. They may be advanced either for the purpose of contradicting the infer- ence of the Naiyāyika or for citing a rival infer- ence with a view to counterbalance it. But both these attempts would certainly fail for the simple reason that the counter-inference of the antithe- ist suffers from the absence of pakṣadharmatā (subsistence of the probans in the subject), through the knowledge of which the validity of inference is invariably determined.99 Objection: The unattached, independent, Ishvara of the form of consciousness may be incapable of creating pradhāna. However, it is quite logical to hold that having eternal know- ledge, desire, and activity, and also being inter- connected with all that is manifested, Ishvara creates the universe out of atoms. Reply: This objection of the Nyaya- Vaisheshika schools is being analyzed and set aside in the following two verses. meJe&%e: meJe&efuehmeg: mekeâuekeâ=efleÙeglees efvelÙeceerMees ÙeefomÙeelmeJeËkeâeÙeË meoemÙeeogoÙeYe=efleueÙee ÙeewieheÅesve Ûe mÙeg: ~ yee¢eesheeoeveJelmÙeeòevegkeâjCeefOeÙeeb efJeMJemeiex JÙehes#ee efvemlekeËâ Ûeevegceeveb ke=âeflejefheefnÙeleMÛes<šÙeeÓLeË efJeOeòes ~~20~~ If Ishvara is always omniscient, all-desiring, and active, then all actions would take place all the time. Creation, preservation, and dissolution would happen simultaneously. (If Ishvara needs atoms as the causal material for the creation of the universe, then) like the external cause (needed by a potter for making a pot) body, sense-organs, and intellect will be needed for the creation of the universe. Presumption will also be unable to quash all the objections (aris- ing in such a case) because indeed effort brings effect only through the body. If Ishvara is thus held to be eternal, omniscient, having all desires, and performing actions suit- able for the creation or birth of everything, then it would be tantamount to saying that all actions take place all the time. For instance, plants and trees flower and bear fruits according to specific seasons. But if the above reasoning were to be adopted, it would mean that there would be no definite seasonal pattern to the flowering and bearing fruits of trees and plants, as they would flower and bear fruits all the time. Objection: What if it be held that associated effects come together at the same time? Reply: That cannot be held so because then the cause and the effect cannot be pinpointed, and it would mean that the cause and the ef- fect would come into existence together at all times. It would be impossible to ascertain when the cause or the effect came into being. Further, it would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. Also, if everything were to happen at the de- sire of Ishvara alone, then all the cycles of cre- ation, preservation, and dissolution would take place simultaneously all the time. There would be no time interval between the creation, ex- istence, and dissolution of anything, and this again would lead to an illogical and impossible situation. Also, it would become impossible to understand any entity because everything would be simultaneously created and destroyed, and thus nothing would exist at any given point of time. That would also mean that practically 647PB November 2013 53Svarajya Siddhih: Attaining Self-dominion there would be no creation. No knowledge of an entity would be possible in such a scenario. If it is held that Ishvara is the only entity that desires and creates things, then imaginary and impossible entities like 'flower in the sky' would also become possible to posit. There would arise many other fallacies like life and death together all the time. If it is held that Ishvara creates the universe from atoms, then again there would be the fal- lacy of infinite regress, because it would be dif- ficult to prove the origin of atoms. Also, just like a potter who makes pots using a potter's wheel and other instruments, Ishvara also would have to use external instruments like the body, sense organs, and the intellect. In that case Ishvara would be just a part of creation and would not be the cause of creation itself. Having quashed the stand that Ishvara is the cause of the universe, now the stand that atoms are the cause of the universe is being set aside. keâmceeoCJees: efkeÇâÙeemÙeelkeâLeceLe efceefueleew efve<Øeleerkeâes keâLeb Jee keâeÙeË leeYÙeeb le=leerÙeb efkeâefceefle Ûe ve cenlheeefjceeC[uÙele: mÙeeled ~ lesYÙe: keâmceevcenevedmÙeeeflkeâefceefle hegvejmeeJesJe efvelÙees ve les mÙeeefVelÙeMÛeeCeg: keâLeb Jee efvejJeÙeJe Fefle yeÇt¢emelkeâeÙe&Jeeefoved ~~21~~ O Asatkaryavadins, please tell! What causes ac- tion between two atoms? (When the coming together of atoms in the beginning of creation is not upheld) how can these two indivisible atoms come together? How can the effect (in the form of a dyad) be different from (these two atoms)? Why is not a dyad of greater dimension like a triad? How can a triad produced out of dyads be of greater dimension than the dyads? (According to your school of thought) why is the triad not eternal? Also, how is the atom in- divisible and eternal? To understand Asatkaryavada we need to under- stand what Satkaryavada is. The Sankhya school follows the causation theory of Satkarya vada. This theory holds that nothing that did not exist previously can be produced. Production of a thing means that that thing is manifested due to some changes or modifications. These changes take place in the causes that effectively had the effects already in them, albeit in a potential form. Therefore, when an effect is produced from a cause, what happens is that the effect, which was already present in the cause, is manifested due to the arising of favourable conditions. Conse- quently, nothing is created, but there is only the manifestation of a thing. This is the theory of Satkaryavada. The kārya, effect, was sat, existing already in the cause. The oil always exists in the oilseed, the statue exists in the stone, and the curd always exists in the milk. This theory just in contrast to Satkaryavada is called A-satkaryavada. It is briefly explained by a scholar: Every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and qualities, but there was no perman- ent underlying dharma or substance. Sāṁkhya also holds in the continual change of dhar- mas, but it also holds that these dharmas rep- resent only the conditions of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals change constantly, but the reals them- selves are unchangeable. ... This doctrine is therefore contrasted to Sāṁkhya doctrine as asatkāryavāda.100 (To be continued) References 99. Gopikamohan Bhattacharyya, Studies in NyāyaVaiśeṣika Theism (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1961), 102–4. 100. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols. (London: Cambridge University, 1957), 1.257.